03 Dec 2004 Daily Telegraph Page 5 (DTN) Edition 1C (1163 words) Baghdad discovery that led to High Court showdown By Caroline Davies and Our Foreign Staff THE Iraqi foreign ministry looked as if it had been struck by a hurricane. Every window was broken, every room had been invaded by looters, and debris lay strewn in the corridors. It was the morning of April 19, 2003, only 10 days after the statue of Saddam Hussein in Firdous Square had been toppled live on the television. Baghdad was in chaos. Three days earlier, David Blair, The Daily Telegraph's correspondent, had gone to the secret police headquarters in search of abandoned Iraqi government documents, but found little of interest. Now he decided to try the foreign ministry. In a tiny room on the building's first floor, later filmed by several television cameras, he found piles of boxes containing pale blue folders. He took two boxes labelled "Britain" and one labelled "Britain-France" back to his hotel and began looking through the papers with a translator. He was hoping to find something related to Tony Blair, and how Saddam's regime regarded his British adversary. Instead, the next day, the journalist came across the photocopy of an intelligence memorandum naming George Galloway, one of the most vociferous opponents of the Iraq war, as the purported recipient of Iraqi oil contracts. Mr Blair did not tell his editors at The Daily Telegraph in London about the discovery until the following morning, by which point he had engaged a second translator to produce a full written translation. Weighing up whether these might be forgeries, Mr Blair noted that crests, signatures and markings on the documents were similar to others in the folders. So was the type of notepaper. The contents of each folder were in chronological order and there was a handwritten index at the front. Each folder was bound with a distinctive single-bowed knot. But the most convincing evidence of their authenticity was the very circumstances of their discovery. They had not been supplied by someone with an axe to grind. Mr Blair had simply found them. Any forger would have had to gamble that an elaborate hoax would be chanced upon by a journalist in the many hundreds of folders within the hundreds of filing boxes in that room. This seemed inherently implausible. The Daily Telegraph's editors in London concurred and debated through the day about how to handle what appeared to be a major scoop. The story had top billing at the morning news conference at 11.15am, and the afternoon conference, around 4.15pm. One of the key questions for the court was to decide at what point these preparations became a firm "decision to publish". The Daily Telegraph's editors testified that the final decision to publish was not taken until some time after the newspaper had obtained a full response from Mr Galloway. But Mr Justice Eady supported Mr Galloway's defence argument that The Daily Telegraph had "rushed to print". Andrew Sparrow, the newspaper's political correspondent, was charged with finding the MP on the Bank Holiday. He received a list of questions from The Daily Telegraph, then read the full translation when it became available around 3pm. He made calls to all of Mr Galloway's known numbers but could not reach him immediately. About half an hour later, Mr Galloway, who was staying at his holiday home in Portugal, found that he had missed a call on his mobile. He called Mr Sparrow back and, over the next 35 minutes, he was told about the contents of the memorandum and mounted a vehement rebuttal. He said he was "flabbergasted" and that the allegations were "preposterous". The documents must be forgeries, he said. By whom? he was asked. "Maybe it's the product of the same forgers who forged so many other things in this whole Iraq picture," he replied. "Maybe The Daily Telegraph forged it. "The truth is, I have never met, to the best of my knowledge, any member of the Iraqi intelligence. I have never in my life seen a barrel of oil, let alone owned, bought or sold one. "It would not be the Iraqi regime that was forging it. It would be people like you," he told Mr Sparrow, "and the Government whose policies you have supported." The next morning The Daily Telegraph splashed the story across its front page, under the headline: "Galloway was in Saddam's pay, say secret Iraqi documents." The key documents were reproduced in Arabic and English on page 2, Mr Galloway's denial dominated page 3, and two more pages carried mainly background articles. Finally, an editorial entitled "Saddam's Little Helper" used the word "treason". Mr Galloway staged a vigorous public defence. The previous night, he had issued a press release through the Press Association news agency. The next day he made a hectic round of television and radio interviews. He said the Telegraph had "either been party to it, or been hoodwinked by it". Either way, "they would answer for it in front of the British courts". The newspaper was "the sewer of choice for whoever is involved in these blackouts of espionage". Mr Galloway would "sell everything", he said, to "fund this libel action". A day after the publication of the initial Telegraph story, one of the newspaper's freelance correspondents telephoned from Baghdad on April 23 to offer a story about documents supposedly found by an Iraqi general. These purported to show that Mr Galloway had received $10million in payments - much larger sums than alleged in The Daily Telegraph's original discovery. But amid concern about the way they had come to light, The Daily Telegraph refused to run the story. The Christian Science Monitor published the Iraqi general's documents, but on June 20 last year conceded that the story was based on forged documents, issued a long apology and paid damages. Within days, on June 27, Mr Galloway served a libel writ against The Daily Telegraph. Sir Philip Mawer, the Parliamentary Standards Commissioner, who had announced an investigation in May, visited The Daily Telegraph's offices in June to inspect the documents. But, on December 2 last year, he suspended his inquiry pending the conclusion of Mr Galloway's libel action. Meanwhile, the Charity Commission, which had begun an inquiry into Mr Galloway's Mariam Appeal in April 2003, said in June this year that it had found no evidence of misuse of funds. By the autumn of this year, the question of whether The Daily Telegraph's documents were "authentic" - in other words whether they were genuine products of the Iraqi bureaucracy - were no longer an issue. At a pre-trial review in October, Mr Galloway agreed the trial would be heard only by a judge rather than a jury. When the case opened in the High Court on Nov 15, the arguments boiled down to the question of whether The Daily Telegraph had reported the documents and their contents in a neutral and responsible manner. Mr Justice Eady ruled that "the nature, content and tone of their coverage" was not, as The Daily Telegraph contended, neutral reportage. Copyright: Telegraph Group Ltd

03 Dec 2004 Daily Telegraph Page 4 (DTN) Edition 3C (880 words) Translation of Iraqi paper that formed heart of the case The document Unattributed Below is a translation of the key document in the Galloway libel case. It was discovered by The Daily Telegraph in the Iraqi foreign ministry in Baghdad on April 19 last year. In the Name of Allah the compassionate and Merciful Republic of Iraq President's Office Iraqi Intelligence Service Confidential and Personal Letter no. 140/4/5 3 /1/2000 TO: The President's Office - Secretariat Subject: Mariam Campaign 1. We have been informed by our Jordanian friend Mr Fawaz Abdullah Zureikat (full information about him attached appendix no. 1) who is an envoy of Mr George Galloway because he participated with him in all the Mariam Campaign's activities in Jordan and Iraq, the following: (a) The mentioned campaign has achieved its goals on different levels, Arabic, international and local, but it is clear that by conducting this campaign and everything involved in it, he puts his future as a British member of parliament in a circle surrounded by many question marks and doubts. As much as he gained many supporters and friends, he made many enemies at the same time. (b) His projects and future plans for the benefit of the country need financial support to become a motive for him to do more work and because of the sensitivity of getting money directly from Iraq it is necessary to grant him oil contracts and special and exceptional commercial opportunities to provide him with a financial income under commercial cover without being connected to him directly. To implement this Mr Galloway gave him an authorisation (attached) in which he pointed out that his only representative on all matters related to the Mariam Campaign and any other matters related to him is Mr Fawaz Abdullah Zureikat and the two partners have agreed that financial and commercial matters should be done by the last (Zureikat) and his company in co-operation with Mr Galloway's wife Dr Amina Abu Zaid with emphasis that the name of Mr Galloway or his wife should not be mentioned later. 2. On 26/12/1999 the friend Fawaz arranged a meeting between one of our officers and Mr Galloway in which he expressed his willingness to ensure confidentiality in his financial and commercial relations with the country and reassure his personal security. The most important things that Mr Galloway explained were: (a) He stressed that Mr Fawaz Zureikat is his only representative in all matters concerning the Mariam Campaign and to taking care of his future projects for the benefit of Iraq and the commercial contracts with Iraqi companies for the benefit of these projects. But he did not refer to the commercial side of the authorisation he granted to Mr Fawaz for reasons concerning his personal security and political future and not to give an opportunity to enemies of Iraq to obstruct the future projects he intended to carry out. (b) He is planning to arrange visits for Iraqi sports and arts delegations to Britain and to start broadcasting programmes for the benefit of Iraq and to locate Iraq On Line for the benefit of Iraq on the internet and mobilise British personalities to support the Iraqi position. That needs great financial support because the financial support given by Sheikh Zaid is limited and volatile because it depends on his personal temper and the economic and political changes. Therefore he needs continuous financial support from Iraq. He obtained through Mr Tariq Aziz 3 million barrels of oil every six months, according to the oil-for-food programme. His share would be only between 10 and 15 cents per barrel. He also obtained a limited number of food contracts with the Ministry of Trade. The percentage of its profits does not go above 1 per cent. He suggested to us the following: First, increase his share of oil. Second, grant him exceptional commercial and contractual facilities, according to the conditions and suitable qualities for the concerned Iraqi sides, with the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Transport and Communications, the Ministry of Industry and the Electricity Commission. (c) Mr Galloway entered into partnership with the Iraqi Burhan Mahmoud Chalabi (available information in appendix 2) to sign for his specific oil contracts in accordance with his representative Fawaz, benefiting from the great experience of the first in oil trading and his passion for Iraq and financial contribution to campaigns that were organised in Britain for the benefit of the country, in addition to his recommendation by Mr Mudhafar al-Amin, the head of the Iraqi Interests Section in London. 3. We showed him that we are ready to give help and support to him to finish all his future projects for the benefit of the county and we will work with our resources to achieve this. But we should not be isolated from Mr Tariq Aziz supervising the project in its different aspects. We are going to make arrangements with him to unite the positions and cooperate to make the work succeed. 4. In accordance with what we have said, we suggest the following: (a) Agreement on his suggestion explained in article 2 b. (b) Arranging with Tariq Aziz about implementing these suggestions and taking care of the projects and Mr Galloway's other activities. Please tell me what actions should be taken. With regards, (Signature illegible) Chief of the Iraqi Intelligence Service 2/1/2000 Confidential and Personal